In recent years, economic historians and anthropologists have focused their attention on property rights and institutions in various contexts and applications, advancing a theory which suggests that together they have provided a mechanism to drive, guide and govern the economic progress of individuals and experience and in the Islamic context in particular.5 Since the interest in investigating the role of property rights in economic organizations peaked, some 30 years ago, an array of paradigms, analytical tools and scholarly framework for measuring their effect on society's economic progress have been developed and applied, enabling us to study economic institutions in different societies and historical conditions comparatively. It is the theory's combination of scholarly significance and analytical tools, which makes it uniquely suitable for measuring the economic performance of the Islamic public good waqf and helping us understand how it functioned.6 The Islamic public good waqf, the Maghribi habhs and the Middle Eastern waqf khayrf, "endowment set apart for a charitable or religious purpose",7 has been the focus of much scholarly attention,8 but have yet to be examined in a theoretical framework which would interpret its workings as an institution and relate them to their economic performance.9 We need to do this because there is a significant discrepancy between the reputation of the waqf as a successful economic institution and the actual historical record of its performance. Two major concerns have been raised, which highlight the inconsistency in the his- 5 North acknowledged that he did not carry out a detailed specification of historical forms, nor did he use primary sources, and that his model is based on national dimensions, rather than on smaller organizations. See North, 1990, p. 71 .
' Not much has been written on public property rights in Islamic law. however, see Ziadeh, 1993. His article speaks only about land, and the author maintains that there is no general theory of property law in the shari'a, and that the relevant issues are scattered in different parts of the Islamic law corpus. Papers on property rights were read at the 1980 conference in Belaggio, Italy, now published in Mayer, 1985, and dealt exclusively with the premodern and modern Middle East and North Africa. Nonetheless, see the papers by Rdmy Leveau and Abraham Marcus, which refer to waqf.
7 Wehr, 1976, p. 1093. Because the term waqf is used in the literature for both family and charity purposes, I opted to use here the term public good to distinguish the charitable endowment for the support of public municipal and religious institutions from the family one. 8 The literature dealing with the various aspects of the waqf is too extensive to be reviewed here in detail. The Encyclopedia of Islam's new entry is currently being written while the old one is outdated. Two special numbers, one of the Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 38.3 (1995), the other of Islamic Law and Society, 4.3 (1997), were devoted entirely to its social, economic and legal aspects. For review of the articles in the JESHO volume see Van Leeuwen, 1999. For review of recent studies see Hoexter, 1998 . I will refer to studies of the waqf in this paper in relation to issues as they occur in the discussion, or when needed in comparative context. 9 Previous studies acknowledged the importance of the interaction of the legal and economic framework as a worthwhile subject, for instance, Arjomand, 1998, p. 110 et sq. Others focused on the financial side, like (izakqa, 1995, p. 313 et sq. As far as the smaller, nonrulers' waqf is concerned, which is the subject of this paper, the number of studies devoted to the medieval financial aspects is limited. With the exception of studies on Egypt, either Geniza or Mamlik documents, most regions lack sufficient documentation dating from the earlier period. torical economic performance of the waqf. The first is its failure to produce and support the kind of institutional learning experience which enhanced Europe's scientific leap forward, despite the fact that it was supposed to have done so as the great supporter of religious and municipal life and institutions, and especially higher education.10 What conferred a unique historical significance on the public good waqf, was the fact that for hundreds of years it provided the only regular financial support for the medresa, a provider of higher education. Fulfilling this role, which was critically dependent on successful economic performance, might well have been insufficient. The second concern is that over the years, the public good waqf formed a considerable property presence in every Islamic land. Its mere survival as a working institution into the 20th century has given historians of Islamic societies reason to describe it as "the promoter of social interaction and economic integration".' Yet, contemporary obsevers of the waqf alluded to some practices, such as "abnormally low rent which is charged for the rent of habous property", which contradict sound economic sense.12 But the mere fact that the waqf survived into the 20th century is not an indication of excellent economic performance. Institutions can be economi- 12 Geertz, 1979, p. 151. Geertz actually thought that the low rent was a positive contribution to the bazaar's economy, even though it does not make any economic sense. See pp. 153-154. He puts the blame for this situation not with the Maliki law, but with the trading community of Sefrou which was entrusted with managing the waqf. The conspicuous fact about the Maliki waqf is that in spite of its poor performance, it continued to exist well into the 20th century. This is how anthropologist Clifford Geertz described the waqf in the Moroccan town of Sefrou in mid 20th century: "183 shops and ateliers, 4 ovens, 4 founduqs, 3 public baths, 4 grain warehouses, a slaughterhouse, 40 houses, 28 rooms within houses and forty water-supply systems for houses. 103 gardens mostly irrigated, 305 fields mainly in rainfall wheat, thousands of live trees, and branches of olive trees separately dedicated. Users and lessees of this great number of properties pay, abnormally low rent which is charged for the rent of habus property and makes for its stabilization at this level". 13 North's study of institutions addressed this historical phenomenon, by suggesting that the persistent inefficient economic institutions as well as poorly performing economies in general was not a phenomena unique to Islam but was shared by Latin American and Asian societies, and attracted the attention of economic historians. See North, 1990, pp. 92-104, where the author provides an analysis of the model which explains this particular phenomena. increasing returns, the imperfect and fumbling efforts of the actors reflect the difficulties of deciphering a complex environment with the available mental constructs-ideas, theories, and ideologies."'4 Some of the divergent perceptions of the waqf's economic performance can be explained by source material and methodology. Studies based on archival records, mostly of waqfiyyas, the acts of endowments registered and kept in the local or regional archives,'5 have so far painted a picture of an auspicious, dynamic economic institution with considerable resources,'6 drawn from endowments made by powerful rulers and their families, the wives and mothers of sultans,'7 and their entourage, wealthy individuals of substantial means, military commanders, merchants and traders.'8 These individuals endowed property for a whole array of public institutions, building monuments, such as shrines, medresas, khanqas, zawiyas, bathhouses and mosques, many of which still stand today, isolated amidst the urban decay of the medieval Islamic cities.'9 In North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Islamic West, inscriptions on buildings and in books as well as chronicles compensate for the lack of archival records for the history of the waqf. The Granadan endowments registered by the church's administration following the conquest of the city in 1492, constitute the exception which proves the rule.20 This methodology has some flaws, initially because of its over-reliance on waqfiyyas, which only capture the initiation of the endowment. It is now agreed that in order to write the long term economic history of the public good waqfc we need to move beyond the early stages of the endowment, and examine what happened to these assets after one or several generations. The wacfiyyas establish the location and identity of the property endowed, objectives, amount of money devoted to each, and other regulations of the endowment, but fail to tell us what happened to it later.2' Sadly, the waqfiyyas also distort the picture of the donors' identity and Clearly, the methodological approach to the waqf needs to be reviewed and reassessed, even for more recent times, when scholarly interest in the question of the waqf and property rights was motivated by the status of the conquered and settled lands under colonial rule. The question of property rights in Islamic law, especially that of the Maliki school in the Maghrib, came up for the first time after the French conquest of Algeria (1830) and again after the declaration of the French Protectorate in Morocco (1912), with obvious results.23 The French jurists concluded that property rights were a grey area in Islamic law, and that there was a basic contradiction between the inheritance system and waqf making which needed to be solved if lands were to be rescued from eternal immobilization. Basing the argument on their reading of the early Maliki jurists in North Africa, the French jurists questioned whether Islamic law possessed property rights at all since ownership of the land was reported, in theory and in practice, to be in the hands of the state, and only the right to its cultivation and building on it, lay in the hands of individuals.24 The French protectorate practice of placing the right to the land in the hands of the state, rescuing it from becoming waqf, was based on this opinion, and was later used by the authorities of pre-and post-independent Morocco to implement it in social reality.25 Whether or not these views were valid, they established a historiographical, if not a historical link, between the weak state of property rights in Morocco, and the popularity of hahus making among Moroccans as a means of protection from confiscation and government misappropriation, despite of its corrupt managerial practices.26 Regardless of biases, both old conclusions and 22 For instance, endowments by artisans have so far remained elusive, leading the investigator of the Egyptian waqf's archives to write, "The latter group is quasi non-existent, and it is clear that they did manage their property and that the pious foundations did not interest them at all." Denoix, 1995 new findings should be questioned with different paradigms in mind to see whether the idyllic picture of a rich, well-endowed, well-run institution with a good economic performance was accurate or whether we can postulate that in reality it was just the reverse.
For the purpose of this study two sets of issues based on the new theory described above have been selected to be applied against the evidence. The first deals with secure and enforced property rights, the second, with institutional arrangements.27 In the next section I propose to apply these issues to a group of fatwas, mostly of Moroccan provenance, taken from the corpus of Maliki fatwds of the Islamic West, known in short as the Mi'yar, collected by a Moroccan scholar, al-Wansharisi, in the 16th century and gathered into a compilation.28 The editor has grouped together all the questions and legal decisions dealing with waqf's matters into one volume entitled nawdzil al-ahbds, which is the 7th of the 13 volume set of the 1982 Rabat edition of the Mi'yar. 75% of the 400 different fatwds deal with endowments for the public good, the rest with family waqf29 The fatwds, written between the 10th and 15th centuries, are presented in the customary question and answer form, giving details of the problem encountered, followed by the resolution. 40 fatwds are briefly summarized here, to display the issues mentioned as a representative sample of the many conflicts surrounding the endowed property which appear in the volume. The assets referred to in the fatwas were endowed several generations earlier and managed over the years by a series of different managers and public office holders. The fatwds are requests by managers for legal solutions to difficulties encountered managing the properties under their care, and sent to jurists living in Muslim Spain and North Africa for their advice. By placing the fatwds in their legal and economic context the discussion will pick up the historical thread where it was left, beyond the particularities of the waqfiyyas, and will provide a better, more accurate picture of the institutional behaviour of the public good waqf, and a more correct economic history of the institution.30 27 These issues are featured in North, The Rise. I have paraphrased the author's introductory overview, focusing on the elements which I will be using for the purpose of comparison. The first question in the next few fatwds is that of the property rights of the new asset endowed. An undated fatwd from al-Andalus speaks of a conflict surrounding a cow endowed to provide milk for the poor.3' Some time after the endowment was made, the donor changed his mind and designated the prisoners, rather than the poor, to be recipients of the milk. The manager of the public good properties questioned whether the owner had the right to change the beneficiary at that time. The jurist replied that if the donor brought out the milk to the poor with his own hands, then he did not sever his property rights in the cow, the transfer of property rights over the cow was never complete and the original endowment act was thus invalid. As a result he could indeed name a different recipient for the milk. Another example of the insecure nature of the assets in the public good wacf is provided in a fatwd written in Fez in the 15th century concerning an orchard endowed to provide income for the maintenance of a mosque.32 The donor had given an extra sum of money to cover the administrative costs of the registration, the notary's work and the witnesses' fees for signing the document transferring the property from himself to the public good. But the endowment was challenged in court and never completed. The donor requested the return of the money he had previously given for registration in order to pay for the costs of the litigation. He received the money back from the waqf and won his case, after which he once again endowed the orchard and again gave money for the notarial registration, but this time, he requested it back from the orchard's revenue now in the hands of the waqf. The manager of the waqf's properties wrote to the mufti asking whether this could be done. The jurist replied that the registration fee could not be paid back from the proceeds of the orchard, since in the first instance the transfer was never completed, and the donor could claim back the money he had given. In the second instance the transfer was complete, the asset was property of the wacqf, and no more claims on it or on the income from it by the donor could be entertained.
The difficulties with establishing property rights over the assets endowed for the public good waqf were compounded by the frequency of endowments of only a half or a portion of an asset, a direct outcome of the inheritance law which divided property into small shares. When this happened, management of the property became difficult and at times downright impossible. This can be seen in the next 3 cases, taking place in 14th century Granada and 15th century Fez.33 The purpose of the endowment of the first two properties is unknown, while the income from the third one was to go towards the maintenance of a mosque. The managers in all threefatwds reported difficulties in handling the properties because property rights were shared between two owners: the public good and a private owner. In the first fatwd, half a hall, qc'a, was endowed but the exact share was not specified, either by measurement or during the transfer process, hiydza. In his answer, the Granadan jurist Ibn Lubb explained that the way to handle this problem was to approach it as if it was a partnership of precisely equal shares, between two owners, who had each contributed equal parts and were entitled to equal benefits.-If, despite his fatwd, more problems occurred, then the partners should appeal to the court for a rule on this issue. In the two fatwds from Fez, a half of a house and a half of an oven were endowed for a mosque, and again the respective parts of the property were not established. The house was rented out and a small amount was deducted from the rent because of the double ownership, a situation prospective tenants learned to dread over the years, given the decline that was known to take place in properties under public administration. The public oven, the object of the last endowment act, stood idle because the manager of the public good properties objected to the contract negotiated by the private owner of the other half for activating the oven. The owner blamed the ndzir for depriving both him and the mosque of income, and the jurist advised that the agreement between the private owner and the baker should stand, despite the manager's opposition to it.35 Again the transfer process did not establish that property rights over the assets endowed were legally, fully and correctly transferred from the owner to the public good.
Related to the issue of secure property rights is the issue of fiee riders, the most frequently encountered problem in the public good waqf's fatwds. Three types of free rider can be detected: an individual who benefits from the public good without contributing to its maintenance, an individual who takes too large a share from the public good benefits, and an individual who appropriates the The first type of common free rider is displayed in two fatwms from 12th and 15th century Fez.36 The first is not directly related to an endowed property, but to voluntary contributions for religious services normally covered by income from endowments. The free riders are shepherds living in a bddiya, a village somewhere in the countryside, where the community hired an imam, to lead the prayer. The young shepherds, who went out searching for pasture, only returning to the village at intervals, refused to help pay the imdm's wages, saying "we will not pay taxes with you since we are present only irregularly, ill/ ghibhh', with you in the prayer behind the imam". The community argued that the performance of legal obligations included participation in religious services and, therefore, required paying for them. Each member of the community had to share in the costs of the mosque and the welfare of the community, even if they only attended irregularly. If their dwellings were in the village they had to pay other financial obligations, lawazim, taxes like the 'ushr and the fitra and the maghram of the sultan etc. In fact the jurist imposed payment on the shepherds, saying that upholding, iqdma, of the law of Islam was indeed incumbent on every person and on every village. The second fatwd describes a refusal to pay for repairs of a large waterwheel, located 4 miles away and maintained by revenue from waqf, which provided the small town with water for irrigation, for the mosque, for the public bath and for drinking. The income from the endowments was insufficient for the repairs and an appeal was made to the public treasury, the bayt al-mal, to help pay for the repairs. Later on, the community was required to collect funds to repay the treasury, but some members said that only rich were obligated to pay taxes for charity levied as a percentage on property and income, 'ushr and zakdt, therefore the same thing should apply to items for the public good. The jurist disagreed and ruled that the whole community should contribute.
The next three fatwas display the second type of the common free rider, one who takes a larger share of the public good benefits or revenue for himself. The first two fatwds from 15th century Fez involve teaching children in the mosque.37 The free rider was the teacher, taking the mosque to be the public domain, and conducting classes there, thus saving himself the cost of renting a special location for this purpose. His justification was that the mosque was maintained by the communal public good funds. However, the jurist ruled that "God did not intend people to make a living in a mosque in this way, in some places, people could no longer pray because of the number of children around." In the secondfatwd dealing with the same problem, the free r-ider used an analogy that the judges held court in the mosque, therefore he could teach there as well. The jurist ruled that both teacher and children should be banished from the premises.
The third, most common type of free rider was an individual, who appropriated public good property for his own exclusive use, as demonstrated in several fatwds. In the first case,38 artisans, married men, worked at their trades in the medresa's rooms, initially endowed to house the students. The manager demanded to know whether they should be made to leave or whether rent should be collected from them. In theory, artisans and other manual workers generated income for themselves, and they could well have paid rent, as did other users of waqf owned stores. In this case however, since the medresa's rooms were not endowed for this purpose, the jurist resisted the temptation to increase the income of the public good, and made the tradesmen leave. In two fatwds written in 14th and 15th century Fez,39 individuals used building materials left over from the building of the mosque for private use; one used rocks, the other sold an old pillar which belonged to the waqf. The first claimed that the rocks were left lying in a field, and used them to build a wall of a castle. He justified it in several ways, first claiming that he had a fatwd allowing him to do so, then that the rocks were excavated when the foundations were dug out, and since the palace belonged to the state's treasury, the makhzen, he was justified in using those left over. The jurist rejected his claim, saying that the rocks belonged to the waqf, and could not be used for anything else, regardless of whether or not the government was involved. In the second instance, a man had removed a pillar from a ruined mosque and installed it in the Friday communal mosque, jami', in order to replace an existing pillar. The discarded pillar was then sold to a private contractor, who built an arc and two elevations on it. The jurist said that the pillar could not be diverted to private use, therefore the guilty parties should return the property. The old pillar was returned and everything built on it destroyed. The expenses were to be paid by the man who removed it from the mosque. 15th century Fez jurists received more than a few complaints about free riders of the waqf's property. The waqf's management complained about someone using endowment revenue for fixing his women's quarter,40 about In 15th century Taza, individuals requested repair of the roofs covering endowed stores which had been damaged in a riot.45 The repairs were estimated at 30 gold dinars and the people who lived in the quarter and wanted to make walkways to protect their houses and themselves approached the waqf and demanded that the income from the rent of the stores should be used for this purpose. The monthly rental payments would allow them to rebuild the roofs of the unspecified funds, from endowments for the upkeep of a community living in a fortress, hisn, defending the frontier. The problem occurred when an individual had used the money to fix his women's quarters. The jurist forbade this use of the revenue because the endowment was made for the welfare of the community as a whole. The repair of one person's women's quarters was not something from which the whole community would benefit. 4' 7: 37, by al-Mazjaladi. In this fatwa, written to and answered by the same jurist, we encounter a community who lived on the frontier. Land sown with esparto. ihalfc', which was sold every year for around 3 dinars, was endowed for their support. The neighbours of this frontier community took control of the land, burned the esparto, planted the land with other crops and gave a quarter of the grain harvested to the fortress' people but refused to allow them to herd their flocks on the land, or use its water. The jurist ruled in favour of the rihdt's people: if the wdqif specified esparto in the endowment act, no other crop could be grown on the land. 42 7: 63, by al-Suyfri, d. 800/1397. The land in this case was taken over by an individual, who claimed to be poor, and cultivated it with the promise to share the proceeds with the other poor of the city. His claim was denied, the land in question was seized, even though he had already ploughed it. 43 7: 77-78, by al-Abdfsi. The two properties fell into disrepair and became a garbage dump, and the neighbours, whose properties were adjacent to the ruined oven, furn, made illegal use of them. Since the properties were no longer in their original state no rent could be collected from them. A neighbour from across the street built a wall in the lane and a door inside it and used one of the dwellings to stable his cow. Another grew hay in it and another planted a fig tree inside the oven and refused to pay rent. He said the wall was built to shield the people from the garbage. The other neighbour said his father had rented two small halls in a courtyard but now the rental period had expired and he said to the manager "I don't need those". The wall protecting the two rooms remained in the courtyard, hiding the room from sight preventing anyone from renting it. The decline in value made it impossible to collect rent or user's fee, and the managers seemed to be at a loss to either recover the property or collect income from it, especially when the neighbours were using it for their own purposes. 44 7: 55-56, by al-'Abdisi. It happened in a mosque, which drew its water from a canal. A pail and a rope, which were used to draw water for use in the required ritual ablutions, were lost after some neighbours of the mosque used them for irrigation or to carry water to their homes. The jurist ordered that rent should be collected from people who used the mosque's property for their own benefit, and if they damaged it, they should be held responsible for replacement. The fatwd reveals that in spite of reiterating the ban on using public property for private use, the jurist allowed rent to be claimed from individuals who did use the tools. ,5 7: 79, by al-'Abdusi. mosque and their walkways, which, they said would benefit the mosque, the stores and the houses in front of the mosque. The jurist disallowed the request, saying that no changes to the instructions of the original endowment act were allowed. The fatwds displayed disruptions in the workings of the public good waqf which were all related to property rights, some to the fact that property rights were not established, the other, that they were not secure. In order to understand why and how this process occurred we need to look into the legal and historical framework of property rights. The first set of disruptions resulted from the failure to properly establish the rights of the public good waqf over the property endowed. Again, this was not simply a symbolic act. A public declaration of ownership change is a requirement justified by economic efficiency, as property owners need to keep communications in this respect perfectly clear: "Clear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-waste conflict,".46 The transfer of property rights is strictly regulated by the Islamic law. The Maliki school requires that all the owners' rights in a property which was given away or sold should be abrogated and definitively terminated, in order for the property to be legally owned by somebody else. The transfer of property rights from the donor to the public good was to be taken care of through this legal procedure called hiydza, which was intended to advertise the fact that the property had changed owners, and which had to be performed in each and every possession taking procedure. It involved a written document, signed before a notary and witnesses, attesting that transfer of property rights had occurred. The Maliki school seems to have been, more than any other, extremely attentive to the performance of a hiyaza, and Malikis left a whole array of legal documents ranging from law manuals, fiqh,47 to fatwds,J4 to watha'iq, the contract formularies from Muslim 46 Rose, 1985, p. 16. 47 The practice took several hundred years to develop, however by the 14th century, the legal routine and the problems associated with public good waqf making were well in place. Best rendered by the 14th century Andalusian jurist Ibn Juzayy, a contemporary of some of the muftis mentioned in a summary in his comparative law manual, as follows: "If the donor made a certain condition in his endowment, it is obligatory to follow it; the management of the endowment should go to whomever he indicated, if he did not appoint anybody, the qddi will; the donor can not manage his endowed property, if he did, the endowment is annulled; the property would be maintained using the income it generates, if this runs out, income should be taken from the bayt al-mdl, if this runs out as well, the property should be left to deteriorate; the donor is not obligated to provide support for it; for a horse, support should come from the bayt al-mal; if there is no money in it, it should be sold and another property should be bought instead, which does not require maintenance like a weapon; Ibn alMajisin does not permit such sale and it is not permitted to destroy the building, nor to change it if part of it broke down, it is allowed to sell it but it should be used in the same manner as the damaged part but others say it should be sold and not passed on to the habts, if everything around it was in ruins." Ibn Juzayy, n.d., p. 281.
48 We can easily recognize in Ibn Juzayy's entry, and specifically in the second part, the 50 A notarized document written in 1495 in Granada provides a glimpse of the hiydza contract's historical significance, especially for females. It was used here in the transfer of property rights to a minor daughter, in a manner which enabled parents to dispossess themselves of a property and then take possession of it on behalf of their daughter still under interdiction. This is done in order to guarantee a smooth transfer of the property after she reaches maturity or in case of their pre-mature death. Property rights also need to be secured and defended. The second set of fatwds dealing with the free rider displayed the problem of preventing an individual from abusing the public good, or forcing him to participate in financing it. By far the most common obstacle to the enforcement of property rights encountered in the fatwas, it was not unique to the waqf institution: Economists refer to it as "classic" in the context of the public good's property rights, but our evidence shows that the access to the public good property was so easy that the damage of the free rider bore a direct and easily measurable cost to the economic efficiency of the waqf.7' The fatwds show that every stage of the process suffered intervention and interference from individuals who had access to the property, the revenue, or both. Apart from speculating and embezzling accumulated funds left to them to be managed, which was a prerogative of supervisors and custodians,57 ordinary people could address the lessees of waqf's property directly, threaten them, use the utensils and the water provided by the installations, take over buildings and building material and abuse the system in every possible way, without adequate deterrence. The chroniclers described numerous examples of managers carrying out major frauds with waqf's revenue, for example the Fezi khatib al-Mazdaghi, lost 30.000 gold dinars of the Fez's public good money speculating in wheat for his own account.58 The existence of a large number of free riders indicated that the public good waclf had no defence against them, because, as an institution, it did not have the appropriate means to do so. Defense of property rights, in this case preventing free riders from abusing the public good, can be achieved by using ideology through which society instills in its members reverence for property rights, or by the state. Because of the monopoly it held over means of enforcement, the state was ideally placed to defend property rights at a lower cost than voluntary organizations, such as the waqf's donors or waqf's management.59
In our case none was available. The ideology behind Islamic philanthropy is given the primary role as the dominant motivation for waqf's making among individuals in the secondary literature. Looking at this ideology as a factor in the economic context, however, reveals its weakness to deter free riders. This ideology's hold over the community's members was weak. As the evidence presented here seems to indicate it was ineffective in deterring individuals. Muslims did not view the public good property rights in the same way they viewed individual property rights. The idea that the proceeds of voluntary giving would be guarded and shared equally by all, did not convince members of the community to refrain from abusing the public good. Whether because of weak ideology, or trust in the helplessness of the system to retaliate, members did not hesitate to engage in practices depriving the public good of revenue. The Islamic ideology system provided the legal mechanism to endow for the public good, but did not provide strong enough measures to force fiee riders, managers, or even sultans for that matter, to respect the property rights of the public good and not to abuse them.6" The other factor which could have deterred free riders was the state, by had endowed. The waqf's managers and the jurists fought back. even denying claims that the money was needed for communal services, such as building benches around the mosque for the community, or preparing for the Jihad.7' So, whether the assets were large and numerous and endowed by the sultans and their entourage, or small, nickel and dime waqf, endowed by people of little means, their fate was the same: to be managed by the wacf's administration, with the attendant problems. To all intents and purposes, the state's role in enforcing the public good waqf's property rights in the Islamic West was lacking.72
The second set of issues in the conflict ridden waqf's management deals with the lack of institutional arrangements. These were needed when changes took place. One such occurrence was when the waqfiyya was lost and the institution had to adjust to the new conditions. In 14th century Fez, a manager was faced with the loss of revenue from land leased to an individual who built a stable on it.73 After the death of the lessee, his children inherited the use of the property and paid rent for it. When the building fell into disrepair, they refused to pay further.74 The jurist advised that if no written document, bayyina or iqrar, which might provide any details of the endowment act or the renting out contract, could be found, they were not liable for payment. A similar case occurred in 14th century Fez, where a store and other unspecified properties were endowed to provide income for an old mosque and a hospital.75 The waqfiyya was lost and an attempt to build a wooden platform in the mosque came to a halt. Unlike the previous case, however, the jurist ruled that the person in charge should do whatever he deemed necessary, despite the loss of the founding instructions. The loss of the waqfiyya in another incident in 15th century Fez, resulted in confusion about what to do with surplus income. This time the income was considerable, and the jurist ruled that half should be used for building expenses and half to provide food for the poor: "If the income is not sufficient for both purposes, then it should go first to provide food because the sick are needy." A jurist from 15th century Tlemcen also agreed to disregard the loss of the waqfiyya in a case submitted to him regarding ar arable land 71 See fatwd by al-Abdisi about such a proposal sent to him for decision, discussed in Shatzmiller, 1991. endowed to support a scholar.76 The support was halted when it was discovered that the original instructions, including the specifications for selecting a beneficiary, had been lost. In his response, the jurist showed concern for the efficiency and expediency of the process: "To avoid loss of revenue, the best candidate available for the position should be selected", he suggested, "a change of the existing regulations to a simple legal partnership arrangement should be done. Instead of receiving his share after the threshing of the wheat is completed, he should be able to gain access to it immediately after the harvest". Even when the waqfiyya was available, the instructions were sometimes insufficient, as it was in the case of unspecified property endowed to buy metal edges for the roof of the great mosque in 15th century Taza.77 The dilapidated metal edges, which had been endowed some time ago, were useless, and unless repaired, were at risk of being lost. The manager requested that the jurist assume the responsibility of making the decision whether to fix them, because he, the manager, had no power to override the waqfiyya. The jurist complied: "... the metal edges should be sold, and items of potential benefit to the mosque should be bought with the money...". Institutional arrangements were also necessary when market conditions changed. Detrimental for economic performance, the results of not having these in place could also be far reaching for the social fabric, as the nextfatwds will show. Threefatwds from 14th-15th centuries' Fez differ slightly from each other but share a common problem: the decline in revenue affected directly the wages paid.78 In the first case, several employees of the mosque, including an imam, leader of the prayer, a mu'adhdhin, who calls for prayer, a rndir, supervisor, and a qbhid, a revenue collector, and others, received regular wages. Over the years, as the income from the waqf's properties grew, the imam requested a raise and he, along with the other employees, such as the Qur'an reader, the commentator, and the hazzadbun, received one. The raise remained in effect until sometime later, when the income declined. Conflict arose when, faced with the dwindling revenue, the manager had to make a decision which service to dispense with, or whether all wages should be reduced and revert to the original state. He asked the mufti whether office holders should be dealt with according to seniority or to the utility of their service, or should the imam be favoured rather than the mu'adhdhin. The jurist decided to maintain equality among the different employees and, if the wages needed to be reduced, then everyone's should be reduced equally. In the second case a group of mu'adhdhins were paid wages from the rent of endowed stores, but the revenue in question was also used to defray other costs relating to the mosque. The ndzir increased the mu'adhdhins' wages to 70 dirhams a month but paid it out of the surplus from other sources. He also increased their number to seven, even though the mosque traditionally employed only four. However, in the following year the mosque needed repairs to its roof. With financial help from other mosques, the ndzir spent more than 300 dinars on this, and refused to give the mu'adhdhins their usual supplement. The mu'adhdhins took the matter into their own hands, going to the endowed stores and demanding that the individuals renting them should pay them the additional money or vacate the premises. They, the mu'adhdhins, claimed that they could use them themselves or rent them out as their right. Some artisans paid up, while others were unable to do so and decided to leave. When no one else wanted to pay the increased rate some of the stores remained unoccupied for some time. The jurist resolved the crisis by retaining only four mu'adhdhins, abolishing the increase, restoring the leases to their previous level and paying back the extra money the mu'adhdhins had extorted. In the third case, the revenues endowed for the benefit of a medresa declined and the beneficiaries, comprising students and staff, a mu'adhdhin, a teacher, a servant and a guardian were faced with the question of whether all staff should continue to receive their entire wages, and only the balance be distributed among the students, or whether the declining income should be shared equally among all. The jurist decided that the servant and the guardian were the only ones to receive their full wages. Firstly, because that was how the wcqif wanted it, secondly, because the medresa depended on their services. The jurist al-'Abdusi who dispensed justice in 14th century Fez, spent much of his time dealing with the waqf's property problems. In the next case he had to decide which of the mosque's services would be affected by the decline in revenue: wages, the amount of oil used, or the number of lamps lit.79 The case involved a man who was employed as a "lighter", waqqdd, in the great mosque for the sum of 12 "small" dinars every month. When he was hired the mosque had 120 lamps but as the income declined, the number of the lamps was reduced to 60 and the lighter received only half his previous wages. He protested, claiming that the number of lamps should be increased so that he could continue to work and be paid as before. The jurist's decision was that only if the original act of endowment specified his wages, and there was an increase in the revenue, would he 79 7: 85-86, by al-'Abdusi. be entitled to receive his entire wages. If there was no income to cover the increase needed to provide more oil and lamps in addition to paying his full wages, he should be offered the option of accepting the reduced wages, or leaving, and someone else should be hired in his place. The decline in income was caused by too many available stores and houses for rent and since these rents provided most of the revenue for wages and maintenance, the employees were directly and immediately affected by it. How to generate income when the assets endowed no longer produced sufficient income, or no income at all was a dilemma to which some managers responded by implementing an investment strategy. One manager in 14th century Fez, suggested to replace an ablution facility with an inn,80 another, to convert a house into a silo in 15th century Fez,8' yet another suggested the sale of a source of water on endowed land in Taza.82 An opening for investment occurred when the Jews of Fez requested permission to dig a canal from the courtyard of the mosque adjacent to their quarter, to supply them with water.83 Given the mosque's fragile state, the structure could be damaged by digging in the courtyard, but the Jews offered to pay for the repairs. Here was an opportunity to benefit the mosque by investing in its foundations and generating some extra income at the same time. However, the manager could not make the decision since he was not sure whether allowing such an action constituted an infraction of the endowment instructions. Following his appeal to the court, the jurist, who saw no contradiction in the xo 7: 57, by al-'Abdusi. The case involved unspecified property, the income of which paid for maintaining two ablution facilities, ddr wudu', for a mosque. One of the facilities became inactive for lack of water, and the ndair wanted to sell it and buy an inn. The jurist denied permission, saying that as long as there was any chance that water could be channelled to the facility and that it could be reactivated, the property could not be sold nor could an inn be purchased. 8' 7: 78-9, by al-Abdusi. An endowed house fell into disrepair but a man wanted to build two silos in it to keep grain. He offered to pay for constructing the silos so they would benefit both the house and the mosque. The earth which would be removed in building those 2 silos, will be used to embellish the house, which would then yield a higher rent. Yet, the jurist refused to allow it, saying: "If you are satisfied that the house does not now, or in the future, need the 2 silos, and if you can rent it in its present condition, you may not improve it without the express permission of the person who made the endowment." 82 7: 88-89. Undated fatwd by Muhammad b. Abd al-Mu'min. (I am unfamiliar with this mufti). A lot endowed for support of a mosque, could not attract occupants. The lot had a source of drinking water on it which the manager wanted to sell separately, but was not sure whether it was permitted for someone to buy the water and use it for another place? "If the share of profit we can derive from the water is neglected and not sold, it will be taken away illegally and become a private property with the passing of time", he said in his enquiry. The jurist's decision was to adhere to the instructions and not allow the sale, even though it contributed to a decline in revenue for the mosque. offer, allowed it on condition that the Jews repaired and improved the canal. One of the most interesting cases revealed in a fatwc, occurred in 15th century Tunisia.84 A row of stores was endowed so that the rent would provide for maintenance of the city's walls but a decline in economic conditions resulted in the stores remaining empty for a long time. In the meantime the walls required repair and the security of the city was threatened. The jurist was asked whether artisans and merchants could be forced to occupy endowed stores, so that income could be generated for fixing the walls. The jurist forbade such action.85
Other fatwCs refer to historical events which affected market conditions, such as the advancing Christian Reconquista in Spain. The first was a general question as to who should be held responsible for providing fodder for a horse endowed for the Jihdd.86 The jurist replied that the donor was no longer responsible for the fodder and absolved him from any lingering responsibility. Another fatwd from 10th century al-Andalus, provided a decision about the future use of endowments for a fortress, which fell into the hands of the enemy.87 The jurist answered that the income should be used to support one of the other Muslim forts in the same manner. A jurist in 14th century Granada was asked about properties endowed in Bijaya to support people exiled from Almeria.88 The recipients included a manager and Qur'an readers, orphans and unmarried young women, and there was also money for dowries for poor girls, lighting of the mosque and maintenance of its coverings, and pious deeds in general. The revenue produced by the endowment was insufficient to finance all these items. Would it be legal to supplement it with income generated in Almeria from properties whose original purpose was not known? The jurist explained that in order to fulfil the mission of a "charitable and a good deed", one is entitled to a share in the revenue generated from assets whose original purpose was unknown. To his mind, revenue whose purpose was no longer known was similar to surplus revenue from assets whose objective was known. He also referred to a decision allowing this solution and implemented by judges in Cordoba. Unlike previous fatwas, which were mere consultations, this one referred to an actual court case, where a ruling, hukm, was issued. The last two fatwas come from 14th-15th century Fez refer to changes following the demographic decline in North Africa. This decline which was confirmed by contemporary chronicles,89 was not seasonal and unlike the yearly market fluctuations, was a new reality which the managers needed to confront. Twofatwds described abandoned villages whose inhabitants had disappeared, but their mosques had assets endowed for them, and these were still producing income. The jurist was consulted by the managers about whether the endowments of a mosque in a deserted village could be sold.90 The managers were eager to spend it on other mosques, but in both cases the jurists' decision was unanimous: endowments which still provided income should not be liquidated as long as there was hope of resettlement. If there was no longer any chance of that, then the land or the rent from it should go to the Friday mosque, the jdmi', or the next mosque, but under no circumstances could the property be sold. Some of the properties endowed were quite insignificant, nickel and dime endowments, but the problems they caused required just as much attention and time, which bore no relationship to their economic worth.9' A woman endowed a saw to be rented out to produce income. The saw had remained in one person's house for 12 years, but now it was feared that it might break. The manager asked what to do. He was also confronted with a similar situation, where an endowed room was inhabited, but so run down that no rent could be collected for its use. The manager offered to sell the endowed properties and buy more profitable ones, but first wanted to know whether it was permissible to do so. The jurist advised that it would be better to sell the saw and buy half a house, or a quarter of a store, so that the mosque would receive the rent from it. As for the room, the jurist disapproved of the option of replacing it with a store, or a water cistern, which would yield revenue. The fatwcis show that in the scramble to resolve conflicts, both the managers and the jurists turned to the waqfiyyas, whose disappearance, absence, insufficiency, loss or vagueness were detrimental to the smooth flow of economic activities. Could waqfiyyas or the jurists for that matter, be regarded as agents for introducing institutional arrangements? Judging by the context the waqfiyyas could not be seen as supplementing institutional arrangements. Useless in dealing with conflicts, they contributed rather to paralysing the situation. The jurists were better placed to supplement institutional arrangements. They were shown attempting to address problems by encouraging the managers sometimes to ignore the lost instructions, and sometimes to use their common sense. They 89 On the demographic decline in the region, see Shatzmiller, 1994, recommended the preparation of a budget, with careful accounting to specify the income, the expenses, future needs and anticipated income. They advocated using tools which would favour better management: good record keeping, and quick resolution of problems before they could become full blown confrontation. Why the jurists could step into the role of agents of conflict resolution is clear. Unlike the managers, they felt more confident in the environment through the power of futya, legal opinion, given to them. However, their power to institute new arrangements was limited, firstly by the law itself, secondly by the nature of their intervention, which occurred infrequently, non-systematically, on a per case basis, and at a late stage in the development of the particular conflict. Moreover, informed economic decisions need to be swiftly implemented, and, as the fatwds show, the necessity of appealing to the mufti or qadd in the absence of arrangements to implement immediate resolutions and informed investment decisions, delayed action by the managers and prevented them from acting immediately as needed. Moreover, the same problem resurfaced again and again indicating that no arrangement was institutionalized. The need to appeal to the jurists to solve disruptions also took up a great deal of time for both jurists and managers, sometimes in no proportion to the anticipated benefit for the community. The managers of the properties and of the revenue exhausted the jurists' time by asking them to deal with questions which were essentially economic, but had to be disguised as legal matters. The large number of waqf related fatwds, decisions made by numerous qddis and mulfts, for very similar causes, indicated frequent disruptions and frequent appeals. But it was the social upheaval resulting from the disruption which highlighted the weakness of the institution. Rather than being "the promoter of social interaction and economic integration", the distress caused by the way the institution operated was expressed in the managers' frustration, and in the coercion used by clients in handling the difficult situations, tearing into the social fabric, and pitting members of the community against each other.92 The damage to the economic potential of the waqf to generate income is also visible. At times the waqf's managers were shown to be aware of how to remedy the situation and willing to engage in other investments, but they were prevented by the lack of power, or tools, in other words deprived of institutional arrangements to affect change. This lack of power to affect change was a great impediment to initiate, and discouraged the managers from taking advantage of the investment opportunities which were available and accessible to private investors. or conclude investment partnerships, all common investment techniques widely practised at the time by Muslims in the very same regions, where individuals, and family trading houses engaged in these practices.93 Instead, the waqf revenue was derived from one source: user fees and rent, whether from land or real estate. This dependence on one single source of income, precluded other investment venues, and was punitive in times of economic decline, if not down right self defeating in terms of the waqf's mandate. The limitation to rent did not protect the waqf from risk, instead it condemned it to face new economic conditions with no power to make changes. Again, the contrast with the East is striking, where it was often possible for Hanafi qddis and managers to effect changes to the waqfiyyas.94
To sum up, the institutional history of the public good waqf, was distinct from that of the family waqf, which evolved concurrently. Its institutional behaviour was shaped by several factors, not shared by the latter, chief among them, ideology. It embodied the Islamic ideal of personal piety, of voluntary giving, which was the proclaimed driving force for endowing property to benefit the public good. For the individual endowment meant, not only the voluntary rejection (waqf, from waqafa i.e. to stop, end, arrest a motion) of full ownership, without personal compensation or future say in management or benefits, but also sharing the benefits on an equal footing with the community. Both required a strong ideological motivation. At the same time there was much more to the making of a public good waqf than just philanthropy. Endowment for the public good had a definite political motivation in many instances, since private and political interests were never far away,95 with patronage, ensuring the loyalty of civil and religious clientele, and control of resources outside the inheritance system, all found to have existed.96 Yet, more then anything else it was the legal factor, which shaped its institutional behaviour, becuase it defined and regulated its activities. Thus the performance of the waqf hinged upon the fulfilment of two mandates: the first strictly legal, to remove a given asset from private ownership and give it a new legal status, as public property owned and operated by the waqf's administration. The second, economic, to carry out the instructions of the waqf's maker as stated in the waqfiyya, efficiently, but essentially to generate income, preserve and manage the asset and prevent its abuse and dilapidation. In this manner the legal and economic mandates of the public 93 See entry "Tidjara" El2. (Maya Shatzmiller). 4 "In the Hanafi manuals current in Balkh in the period of this study there were provisions for sale, exchange, and/or lease of waqf property...", McChesney, 1991, p. 13. 95 On the Islamic view see Arjomand, 1998. 96 For two cases see Marcus, 1985 , p. 123 on Aleppo, and for Fez, Shatzmiller, 1991. good waqfwere intertwined, mutually dependant and influential. Despite the clearly defined mandates the evidence discussed here shows a public good institution whose economic performance was flawed. Problems were expressed in two ways: in procedure, the everyday operation of the system was conflict ridden and prone to come to a halt; and in lack of economic growth. The fatwcs show institutional behaviour resulting in loss of revenue, confusion, interruption of work, increased costs, declining revenue or no income at all. The returns for both the institution and society, were at best insufficient and in many instances completely absent. In the long run the compounded structural problems resulted in the liquidation of the assets and the failure of the institution to carry out its institutional mandate, to support religious, municipal and scholarly life and institutions. The causes could be traced back to several issues, primarily, insecure property rights and lack of institutional arrangements. Here the legal system, which defined and regulated the waqf, failed to provide adequate institutional arrangements, while its ideology and the state, failed to enforce the public good property rights. Nonetheless, the fatwds examined were Maliki and the way the Maliki waqf developed in the Islamic West diverged from the way it developed in other regions. This might have had a direct impact on its institutional economic performance.
